Workplace privacy is generally recognised as one of the most contentious ethical issues in current debates in computer ethics. This paper will distinguish between two types of justification of privacy, namely privacy as intrinsic and instrumental value. By looking at different sources of privacy in English law, the essay will suggest that the legal protection of privacy is based on philosophical assumptions and that the intrinsic -instrumental distinction is of relevance concerning the legal protection of workplace privacy. This will be supported by an analysis of different statutory protections of privacy, notably the Data Protection Act 1998, the Regulation of Investigative Powers Act 2000 and the Human Rights Act 1998. The essay ends with a speculation about why such different and possibly irreconcilable underpinnings have found their way into English privacy law.
Introduction
Privacy is generally accepted as one of the main issues of computer and information ethics. New technologies raise a number of issues for privacy protection. Governments in many countries have recognised that this is a problem that their citizens are sensitive towards. There are thus laws and regulations that attempt to address the issue of privacy. Behind those laws, however, there are philosophical concepts of privacy that are not always easy to identify but that are important to recognise if one wants to understand how and why privacy is legally protected. This paper will concentrate on the case of the UK and analyse the UK legislature's view of privacy. The main emphasis is on the question of employee privacy and how it is affected by different pieces of legislation. The essay will focus on the question whether the introduction of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which includes a right to privacy, heretofore unknown to English law, adds anything to employee privacy as delimited by the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). There has been some speculation that says that privacy protection of employees was well established before the European Convention on Human Rights became British law through the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). The paper will argue that such a view would be false because the HRA influences employer-employee relationship in a number of ways. The Article 8 provision of personal privacy is an important aspect of this. One could approach this question superficially by exploring how the HRA in general and Article 8 in particular have changed the nature of privacy protection in work relationships. However, this paper will use a different strategy. It will concentrate on the very notion of privacy and make the argument that the ECHR implies a wider concept of privacy than the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) or the Regulations of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). In order to develop this argument, the paper will begin with a brief review of the literature on privacy. It will then discuss the DPA and RIPA and how privacy is perceived and protected by both. In a subsequent step the paper will discuss the nature of the impact of the ECHR on employment relationships and particularly on privacy considerations within those. The paper will conclude by outlining the different implications of the respective notions of privacy and discussing possible reasons for the development of different concepts of privacy.
Privacy
There seems to be general agreement that privacy is important. There is much less agreement on why it is important or what it actually is (Weckert & Adeney, 1997) . Gavison (1995) has identified several aspects of it. Privacy can be a situation, a right, a claim, a form of control, or a value. It relates to information, autonomy, identity, or access. Alternatively, it can be split into the aspects of confidentiality, anonymity, and data protection (Rotenberg, 1998) . Concerns of privacy can be followed back in time at least to the ancient Greeks (Arendt, 1958) but explicit legal recognition of the term in some jurisdictions did not come before the late 1800s (Sipior & Ward, 1995) . The most widely spread definition was coined by Warren & Brandeis (1890, 205) who called privacy the "right to be let alone". This definition (often changed to the right to be "left" alone) is still used frequently today (Britz, 1999; Velasquez, 1998) . This right to be left alone seems to be attractive and capture imaginations but it does not lend itself to clear legal (or moral) implementation. In order to create more clarity, scholars have introduced different approaches to privacy. An important stream of the literature links privacy to control over information or control over access to information (Tavani & Moor, 2001; Elgesem, 2001; Fleming, 2003) . A related approach is that of informational self-determination (Stalder, 2002) . It defines privacy as the right to determine who accesses person-related data. This interpretation is widely spread in continental Europe but seems to have little resonance in the AngloAmerican world. Another related approach is that of seeing privacy in terms of property. If person-related information can be treated as property, then privacy issues can be reduced to the more established (intellectual) property law (Spinello, 2000) . There are further approaches to privacy that cannot be discussed in a short overview. What is important to briefly consider, however, is that there are a variety of reasons why it is valued. A basic distinction can be drawn between privacy as an intrinsic or instrumental value (Tavani, 2000) . If privacy is an intrinsic value, then it requires no further external justification. On a very fundamental level one can see respect for privacy as an expression of respect for the other (Elgesiem, 1996; Introna, 2003) , for an autonomous being. This would link with Continental European ethical theories in the tradition of Kant (1961) but also with 20 th century existentialist ethics as developed mostly in France by thinkers from Sartre to Levinas. A related view of the intrinsic value of privacy stresses its importance for the development of a secure and reliable identity (Severson, 1997; Brown, 2000; Nye, 2002) . It allows the individual to develop their autonomy, which is a necessary precondition for ethics in the Kantian deontological tradition (Spinello, 1997; Brey, 2001; van den Hoeven, 2001 ).
As an instrumental value, privacy has been described as important because a truly private space is necessary for mental health (Nissenbaum, 2001) . It is required to trust others and, more generally, to develop good social relations (Gallivan. & Depledge, 2003; . A functioning society thus requires the provision of privacy for its members (Introna, 2000) . Privacy is also closely related to power relationships. Surveillance, as one of the main organisational challenges to privacy, can be used to establish and strengthen power. This kind of thought is closely linked to Foucault's (1975) development of Bentham's Panopticon (Rule, James B. et al., 1995; Yoon, 1996; Goold, 2003) . Having now established that privacy is a value worth protecting, it is important to note at the same time that it is not an absolute value (Charlesworth, 2003) . The simple thought experiment of a society with total protection of privacy shows that such a situation would lead to the collapse of rule and order. There must thus be limits to privacy. There are other considerations and values, which can override interests of privacy. One such set of values comes from employers. Employers have a variety of reasons for gathering data about their employees. These include the avoidance of "cyberslacking" (Siau et al., 2002 p. 75 ) of "cyberslouching" (Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002 p. 80) and thus the increase of productivity. Data gathering, which is usually facilitated by the use of information and communication technology (ICT), also helps companies safeguard their property and it is also often described as an aspect of risk management. It helps organisations avoid risks of misuse of their equipment and of being held liable for misconduct of their employees. Again, we cannot do justice to the variety of arguments raised in this respect. It is important in the context of this paper, however, to raise these issues because they affect the standing and importance of privacy. We have now seen that privacy can be seen as an intrinsic value, which would render it similar to a human right. On the other hand, it can be seen as instrumental, and thus not worth defending for its own right. Depending on which interpretation one prefers, the weighting of employee privacy interests against employers' commercial interests will come to different conclusions. The main argument of this paper will be that the English tradition of privacy is based on the weaker instrumental view of privacy and thus facilitates abridgement of privacy. The contribution of Article 8 of the ECHR is then that it introduces a stronger (continental European) notion of privacy, which renders commercial interests less important. The coming sections will support this contention by discussing the different ways in which privacy is protected through the DPA, RIPA, and the ECHR.
The Notion of Privacy in the Data Protection Act 1998 and Regulations of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
This section will briefly review the DPA and RIPA in order to deduce the underlying concept of privacy that informs both acts.
Privacy in the Data Protection Act 1998
The DPA was the UK's implementation of the European Directive 95/46/EC whose purpose was to create universal European standards for the collection, storage and processing of personal information. It limits the extent to which persona data can be gather and what can be done with it. Another important aspect is that it allows individuals to access and check information held about them. Data is defined in s 1(1) as information which is being processed automatically and is part of a filing system. The most important part of such data is data that is collected electronically. The European Directive 95/46/EC aims to implement the OECD Fair Information Principles (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2004) . It therefore requires Member States in Article 6 to ensure that data is processed fairly and lawfully, that it is only used for the purpose it was collected for, that there is no excessive data collection, that the data is kept accurate, and that it is anonymised, where the identity of the individual is no longer needed. These fair information principles are incorporated into the DPA which provided the basis for the creation of the office of the Information Commissioner who oversees privacy issues. Individuals or organisations who want to collect personal information must register as data controllers and comply with the regulations of the act. On the face of it, one could interpret the DPA as a strong means to ensure privacy. However, it is quite explicit about the need to consider employer interests in collecting data. To return to the above argument that there are the two views of privacy as a intrinsic or instrumental right, one can deduce from the practice of the information commissioner that it is seen as instrumental. While employers are forced to collect data only for relevant business purposes, there is no description of what would constitute a legitimate business interest (cf. Johnson, J. 2001) . Such a conclusion is supported by Schedule 7 of the DPA which explicitly exempts employment-relevant data from some of the protection that personal information is generally afforded. This seems to suggest that employers' interests are not limited by a more fundamental right to privacy.
Privacy in the Regulations of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
Another important piece of legislation with regards to privacy in employment relationships is the RIPA. It goes beyond the DPA in that it applies to communication services that are not publicly available. It is the UK's implementation of the European Directive 97/46/EC. RIPA is important for this paper because it affects employers' ability to interfere with communication. Originally aimed at telephone communication, it can arguably also be applied to email or other forms of electronic communication.
The RIPA states that it shall be an offence to intercept a communication transmission, even if it takes place on a private network. There are, however, exceptions (s 4), which render such interceptions lawful. These exceptions are elaborated in the . In s 3(1) some reasons for interception are named. They include quality control, national security, and crime prevention and detection. In practice this means that employers again have a right to breach the privacy of employees' electronic communication if they can establish a business interest for doing so. This arguably goes against the spirit of the Telecommunications Regulation 1999, which had the explicit aim of ensuring protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data in the telecommunications sector (Information Commissioner, 2005) . The implied understanding of privacy thus seems to be an instrumental one. Privacy of employees can be weighed against business interests of employers. A possible explanation of the apparently weak standing of privacy in DPA and RIPA and related regulations is that privacy is confined to the private sphere. By entering an employment relationship, employees lose any non-negotiable right to privacy. While the acts put the onus on employers to safeguard personal information insofar as they have no direct business case to use it, legitimate employer interests can override privacy concerns. Interestingly, it is never defined what a legitimate business interest is.
Privacy in the Human Rights Act 1998
The HRA implements the European Convention of Human Rights as an integral aspect of British legislation. The HRA is mainly concerned with the relationship between citizens and state. An initial interpretation could therefore be that it does not affect private sector employment relationship. Such an interpretation would be misleading for a variety of reasons. The HRA can be applied directly by employees of public authorities because s 6(1) imposes a duty on public authorities to ensure they comply with the Convention. Employees in the private sector are supported in their privacy concerns because s 3a provides a general duty on British courts to interpret all legislation consistently with the convention. Finally, and most broadly, Article 1 (cf. Johnson, J, 2001 ) of The Convention requires states to secure Convention rights to everyone in their jurisdiction. That means that Convention rights, when affected in employment relationships, can attain relevance in employment outside of public authorities. This is true for all human rights enumerated in the Convention, including the right to privacy as detailed in Article 8. Article 8 guarantees everyone the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. Section 2 details the limits to this right. The history of interpretation of Article 8 by the European Court of Human Rights has shown that the right to privacy is to be understood quite broadly. It relates to sexual identity, personal information, and phone calls from business premises. An important case establishing the breadth of interpretation was Halford v UK (1997), where it was held that the interception of phone calls was a breach of privacy, even though the claimant was a member of the police and the calls were made from "business premises". This was upheld in Valenzuela Contreras v Spain (1999) where the court held that monitoring telephone conversations breached the right to respect for private life. Another implication of Halford was the support it lent to the contention that the state has an obligation to protect citizens' privacy. This was endorsed by Douglas v Hello Ltd (2001) . The arguably most important impact that the HRA has on privacy in employment is its influence on jurisprudence. Section 3 HRA requires courts to interpret all legislation in a manner compatible with HRA. This includes a different interpretation of reasonableness that employment tribunals need to apply. This means that employment tribunals will not draw a distinction between legislation governing public authorities and private individuals when considering issues of human rights, as established by X v Y (Employment: Sex Offender) [2004] . It also means that issues of fair trials (Article 6) can enter considerations of privacy. Evidence produced by covert means may not be admissible when it gathering it breached Article 8. Also, the HRA requires the interpretation of case law in a way compatible with Article 8, which may have further implications. Despite the broad reach of Article 8, privacy is not considered an absolute right. It is therefore interesting to see how the European Court of Human Rights has weighed privacy considerations when compared with employers' interests. In MS v Sweden (1999) the claimant complained about the fact that medical data had been provided to an employer which had subsequently led to the termination of her employment. The court held that there had been no violation of Article 8 because the interference had had a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. Another concern accepted by the court as overriding privacy concerns is the prevention of crime. In Friedl v Austria (1996) the question was whether the state had the right to photograph members of a demonstration even though Friedl was not prosecuted. It was held that Article 8 was not violated because prevention of disorder and crime are legitimate aims of the state and necessary in a democratic society. A similar securityrelated judgement was made in Leander v Sweden (1987) where security concerns outweighed privacy. Leander was refused permanent employment on the basis of information held in a secret police file. And while his Article 8 rights were affected, this was deemed lawful because of security concerns.
The HRA applies to all other legislation and its interpretation through the courts. That means that it also applies to the DPA and RIPA. It has established that considerations of proportionality, awareness and expectation of privacy play a role when the right to privacy of an employee is balanced with interests of an employer. The question of balancing competing rights and interests is thus a central issue of DPA, RIPA and HRA. However, the above section should have shown that the implied concept of privacy is different in the HRA. It recognises the limited nature of the right to privacy but the limits are more explicit and narrower than the ones in DPA and RIPA. Most importantly, purely economic interests will find it more difficult to stand the test of proportionality than substantial considerations such as prevention of crime and security.
Conclusion
This paper has put forward the argument that an important contribution of the HRA which goes beyond the DPA and the RIPA is its implied wider concept of privacy. If this is the case then it stands to reason that it will strongly influence the further development of British law. Since the HRA is somehow located on a "higher" level of law, it will most likely permeate its implications into the British legal system. The reason why the DPA and RIPA are based on different concepts of privacy than the HRA is probably the different legal tradition they stem from. Even though both DPA and RIPA are English laws that embody European Directives, they are much more closely linked to the English legal system. Their drafting and subsequent interpretation is based on the English liberal tradition with its strong emphasis on free trade and autonomy of the economic sphere. The Convention, on the other side, is strongly linked with the continental European legal tradition where privacy is a well established right. In Germany, for example, the right to informational self-determination has been established by the Constitutional Court to have constitutional standing, despite the fact that it is not explicitly named in the constitution (Hoffmann-Riem, 2001) . One can thus argue that this recognised right to privacy as an intrinsic value is finding its way into the British legal system via the HRA. Whether this is desired and acknowledged by the British legislature and executive is a different question. However, it seems to be a step in regulating the economic sphere by importing rights, such as privacy, which in the liberal tradition are confined to the privacy of home and family. One can perceive this as an overdue step as it helps overcome outdated understandings of employment such as the "master servant relationship of the early twentieth century" (Johnson, J., 2001 p. 168) and replace it with a more measured and equitable relationship which the European Convention of Human Rights stands for.
